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1: Introduction 
 
Evaluation is of interest as it is an important tool in the allocation of scarce resources. 
It not only helps determine the nature of programmes and ensures efficiency or ‘value 
for money’ in public expenditure, but it serves to support other objectives, such as the 
accountability of public bodies (Batterbury, 2006).  A striking feature of evaluation is 
the ‘gap’ that exists between the practice and the theory of evaluation, as given by the 
extensive literature on appraisal and Cost-Benefit Analysis (e.g. Boardman et al, 
2006).  It reflects the development of these as independent exercises, although it is not 
unique to Economics, as Cullis and Jones (1998) point to a similar ‘gap’ between the 
practice and theory of taxation.  In practice, evaluation is often empirically-driven, but 
theory is important in providing a foundation and framework, and informing on what 
needs to be done.1  It can also help to clear up some of the misunderstandings and 
misconceptions that characterise current practice. 
 This paper examines the evaluation of regional industrial policies, focusing on 
those evaluations carried out at the microeconomic level – i.e., micro-evaluation – and 
drawing on the evaluation and economic appraisal literatures.  Taylor (2002) reviews 
the methodological approaches that have been used to evaluate UK regional policy, 
and shows that for the past 20 years it has mainly been evaluated using micro-based 
approaches (Nicol, 1982, reviews earlier macro-methods at the European level). There 
are good reasons for this, including a smaller level of expenditure that is applied at a 
sub-regional scale in spatially-fragmented areas, for which aggregate data are difficult 
to obtain.  The main method is the industrial survey approach, in which the responses 
of the managers of firms to carefully-constructed questionnaire surveys are used to 
attribute the policy effect (e.g., King 1990).2   
Central to the survey approach is the concept of ‘additionality’, which is the 
extent to which policy induces a change for the better in a supported project, either in 
scale, location or timing (Lenihan, 1999).  It is increasingly used in European regional 
policy evaluation (e.g., Florio, 2006), but as if to indicate the ‘gap’ between practice 
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and theory, it neither features in Cost-Benefit Analysis - or Economics more generally 
- nor in the US policy evaluation literature.  This discrepancy is puzzling and non-
trivial, as ‘additionality’ is recommended practice in the Central Government ‘Green 
Book’ on evaluation (HM Treasury, 2003a, Annex 1), while some UK agencies have 
issued extensive guidelines, e.g., English Partnerships (2004).  More fundamentally, 
Swales (1997) and Honohan (1998) both argue for a different approach to evaluation, 
based on Cost-Benefit Analysis. It potentially offers a sounder basis for the evaluation 
of regional policy in terms of its final impact and contribution to social welfare. 
The purpose of this paper is to explore the relationship between the practice 
and theory in the micro-evaluation of regional policy.  At a general level, it seeks to 
demonstrate how an evaluation based on Cost-Benefit Analysis would proceed and 
how it differs from current practice (section 3).  At a more specific level, it considers 
the theoretical foundations for ‘additionality’, and shows that in current useage it does 
not guarantee ‘value for money’ (section 4). Before this, a simple model of evaluation 
is outlined, which is based on evaluation practice (section 2), while conclusions are 
drawn in section 5.  The evidence is based on the UK regional policy experience, but 
the arguments are applicable to other countries and to other instruments. 
 
2: The ‘Logic Model’ of Evaluation 
 
Evaluation is “[t]he systematic and objective assessment of an on-going or completed 
project, programme or policy, its design, implementation and results” (DAC, 2002, p. 
22).  Figure 1 postulates a ‘logic model’, drawn from evaluation practice, which shows 
a chain of cause-and-effect for a single intervention, running from the input to output, 
to outcome and to impact.  It both offers a useful framework and draws attention to the 
terminology, over which there is confusion in the literature (QAG, 2003).3   
 In essence, the input is the intervention, which is measured in either financial 
or opportunity cost terms.  Via a set of activities, which can be viewed as a production 
process, this generates the output.  However, the key issue is that not all of the output 
produced may be attributable to the intervention, as it might have occurred in some 
form, location or timeframe in its absence.  In principle, it is possible to identify (but 
not to observe) the counter-factual output that would have occurred in the absence of 
the public support – known as the without-policy or without-subsidy position – and 
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this is shown in Figure 1.  The difference between this and the observed output is the 
outcome, which is that part of the observed output due to the intervention.     
The outcome is the short-run effect occurring in the market directly affected 
by the intervention, whereas the impact is the longer-run economy-wide effect across 
all markets, including the direct market.  It is the impact that is ultimately of interest 
in determining whether an intervention has improved social welfare, and hence if it is 
worthwhile (for which the outcome might give an important clue).  In addition to the 
outcome, the impact takes account of the following kinds of external effect:4
• Displacement: Effects occurring elsewhere in the direct markets (input and 
output markets) from the displacement of activity; 
• Linkage: Effects in related markets, occurring ‘vertically’ in production 
(backwards or forwards) or ‘horizontally’ in consumption;  
• Feedback: Longer-run effects in the direct market arising from the linkage 
effects and broader macroeconomic feedback effects; and  
• Multiplier: Effects in subsequent periods from increased factor incomes. 
 
The ‘logic model’ suggests two kinds of evaluation.  The first focuses on the outcome 
and is a ‘bottom-up’ approach using micro data and techniques, such as the industrial 
survey.  The second examines the impact and is a ‘top-down’ aggregate-level method, 
such as for a region.  The model is important in drawing attention to the several issues 
that bedevil evaluation practice. One is the reconciliation of the results from the micro 
and macro approaches, i.e., the outcome and impact, and the other is the difficulty in 
micro-evaluation of moving from output to outcome.  These are now explored. 
 
2.1 The Link between Outcomes and Impacts 
 
In context of European Union Cohesion policy, Bradley et al (2005) argue that the 
evaluation challenge is to reconcile the results from the macro- and micro-approaches. 
This is difficult, as the two approaches use different methodologies with respect to the 
methods of data collection, techniques for data analysis and tools on which to base the 
judgement (Tavistock Institute with GHK and IRS, 2003).  More fundamentally, the 
approaches are undertaken according to different objectives, which for the outcomes 
and impacts are known as the specific and global objectives respectively (see Figure 1 
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and EC, 2000).  In general, the two kinds of objective should be consistent, so that the 
achievement of the specific objective should lead naturally to the accomplishment of 
the global objective.  In practice, there may be several instruments in support of the 
same global objective, each with their own specific objective.5
The nature of the specific and global objectives makes the comparison of the 
results from micro and macro-evaluation approaches difficult to reconcile.  It requires 
knowledge of the external effects identified above, and time lags involved, but which 
ultimately may be unbridgeable due to the ‘aggregation problem’.  Many micro-
evaluations do not even consider the external effects, in which case it is a matter of 
deductive belief that with the passage of time a positive outcome will lead naturally to 
a positive impact.  Even where reconciliation is not the aim, Baslé (2006) argues that 
it is useful to collect information on the external effects, as it not only indicates how 
policy works, but it helps confer plausibility on the evaluation results. 
An interesting feature of the UK regional policy evaluation is that both the 
micro and macroeconomic approaches have tended to evaluate policy in terms of the 
specific objective of job creation (see King (1990) for a ‘bottom-up’ micro study and 
Gillespie et al (2001) on the ‘top-down’).  There have been very few UK evaluations 
undertaken relative to the global objective of reducing regional disparities.  A reason 
for this might be because the global objective is closely tied to political objectives, 
and varying between administrations, whereas the grant objective has been essentially 
unchanged since the grants were introduced in the early 1970s. 
 
2.2 The Link between Outputs and Outcomes 
 
The more usual ‘black-box’ in evaluation is the link between the inputs and outputs.  
This can be viewed as a production process, which is realised in two states – the with- 
and without-policy positions – and which together determine the outcome (Figure 1).  
The positivist tradition of Economics may reveal little about the processes by which 
the policy effect comes about, not least because the processes are complex.  However, 
the exploration of ‘additionality’ through interview may reveal how the behaviour of 
agents is changed by policy, and hence help open the ‘black-box’.   
‘Additionality’ is “the extent to which an activity is undertaken on a larger 
scale, takes place at all, or earlier, or within a geographical area of policy concern, as 
a result of public intervention” (HM Treasury, 1997, p. 96).  It reveals how much of 
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the observed output is attributable to the intervention.  ‘Additionality’ may arise from 
the inputs or activities, and this point is taken up below.  Under other interpretations it 
is sometimes used to refer to competitor firms and agents in related markets, although 
this is a misuse of the term.6  A final point is that ‘additionality’ is used in UK and EU 
micro-evaluations, but it is little mentioned in US evaluations, if at all, reflecting the 
fact that it does not feature in the Economics literature on appraisal. 
 
3: The External Effects 
 
The external effects, which are identified above, form the link between the outcomes 
and impacts, but are rarely measured in micro-evaluations.  This section demonstrates 
how the effects are measured in Cost-Benefit Analysis.  Two kinds of external effects 
are considered, occurring the direct markets (output and input) and in related markets.  
Multiplier effects are considered elsewhere, such as in Armstrong and Taylor (2000).  
Throughout, outputs and inputs are each homogeneous and the policy is large, so it 
shifts market supply and demand curves.  Both features are reasonable for regional 
interventions.7  The goods are marketed, and, with the exception of the labour market, 
there are no price distortions, on which more is said below. 
 
3.1 Displacement in the Output Market 
 
Figure 2 shows how displacement is measured by Cost-Benefit Analysis and how this 
differs from current evaluative practice.8 It shows the market in which the extra goods 
or services are produced as a result of the intervention, where the initial demand and 
supply curves are D and S and the initial equilibrium is at position a.  The intervention 
shifts the supply curve to S’, causing the market price to fall from po to pn.  This leads 
to displacement, as the lower price reduces the willingness-to-supply of producers not 
subject to the intervention, causing a movement down the initial supply curve S from 
a to e.  While the horizontal shift in the supply curve is dc, the increase in aggregate 
output in the direct market is only fc, so that df represent the displacement of output.  
Current evaluation practice measures the benefit (i.e., increased sales) as the 
gross revenue less that that is displaced, equal to bcfg to Figure 2.9  However, Cost-
Benefit Analysis differs from this, as suppliers bear costs in producing the displaced 
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output that are now avoided, so it deducts the value of this producer surplus.  This is 
the area popnea in Figure 2, which not only includes the displaced units, but the units 
that continue to be produced by other suppliers but at a lower price.  However, the 
analysis does not stop there, as the reduction in price makes consumers better-off, and 
their increased surplus is the area popnba.  Assuming that producers and consumers 
are treated the same, the direct benefit of the intervention is equal to the area abcde. It 
is unambiguously greater than that measured in practice, i.e., bcfg.   
 It suggests two differences between evaluation practice and theory.  Not only 
does practice ignore the cost of producing the displaced output, but it fails to take 
account of the effect on consumers.  Of course, it could be argued that the benefit to 
consumers is inconsequential and best ignored, but it arises from the price fall, which 
is the transmission mechanism for the displaced output, so that it is difficult to include 
one while ignoring the other.  The difference in the measurement of the direct benefit 
between evaluation practice and theory is smaller the more elastic is demand, but only 
when demand is perfectly elastic does practice record the same effect as theory, since 
in this case there is no price change and hence no displacement effect.  This requires 
knowledge of the elasticities of demand and supply.10
 
3.2 Input Markets 
 
Similar considerations apply when valuing the cost of the intervention in each input 
market.  Increased factor demand may induce higher input prices and impact on factor 
demand elsewhere, and this is the source of displacement in the input market.  Again, 
to illustrate the divergence between practice and theory, the micro-evaluations of the 
regional policy employment effect typically make an adjustment based on the output 
market, but ignore displacement in the labour market from a higher wage.11   
The labour market is of interest given that regional policy tends to be applied 
in the areas of relatively high unemployment, where activity rates and gross domestic 
product are low.  Several extra considerations apply:  First, individuals filling the new 
jobs might otherwise be unemployed, so they are not a resource cost, and this is the 
main economic rationale for job creation schemes in areas of high unemployment.  It 
might be thought that there is no wage effect in these areas, but Gillespie et al (2001) 
find a large displacement effect for regional grants in Scotland.  Second, Cost-Benefit 
Analysis supposes a frictionless world, in which individuals move instantaneously 
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and costlessly between jobs, so that there are no adjustment costs.  However, this may 
be implausible for regional policy where labour is geographically immobile. 
 
3.3 Linkage Effects 
 
Linkage effects occur through the price mechanism and may be forwards [backwards] 
if the project sells [buys] its output [inputs] to [from] other producers, or sideways if it 
is consumed either with or instead of other goods and services, i.e., complements or 
substitutes.  The intervention affects these other markets by shifting the demand and / 
or supply curves and potentially changing the prices in the other markets.  However, 
the general rule in Cost-Benefit Analysis is that the effects in related markets can be 
ignored except insofar as they have feedback effects in the direct market (Sugden and 
Williams, 1978).  These feedback effects are measured in the direct market, so that for 
the purpose of measurement the related markets can be ignored.12   
This is an important result, which means that the measurement of the impact is 
greatly simplified using Cost-Benefit Analysis. Broadly, the reasoning is that when an 
intervention changes a price in a related market it makes some agents better-off (e.g., 
consumers from a lower price) but other agents worse-off (i.e., producers), and these 
transfers effectively cancel, save for the feedback effect in the direct market. It means 
the long-run effect (after the feedback has occurred) will be smaller than the short-run 
effect, as the demand curve pivots inwards about position a in Figure 2. 
 
3.4 Overview of CBA Approach 
 
Cost-Benefit Analysis is often advocated for the appraisal and evaluation of industrial 
policy (Swales, 1997; Honohan, 1998).  It is based on measuring surpluses rather than 
gross effects (e.g., number of jobs or level of sales). Potentially, it offers a sounder 
basis for the evaluation of regional policy in terms of improvements to social welfare, 
and it is useful in drawing attention to the role of prices and wages as the transmission 
mechanisms in the economy.  It also has advantages in relation to the external effects, 
which are either ignored or crudely calculated in many existing micro-evaluations, but 
are important in determining the impact.  The worked example of displacement shows 
it is likely to yield different results, but while it has advantages, it also has drawbacks 
that may limit its appeal, which briefly are as follows: 
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• It requires knowledge of the surpluses, profits or rents earned by agents; 
• The effects must be measured for both producers and consumers to ensure 
consistency of the approach, which otherwise is undermined; 
• It requires knowledge of the demand curve in both short and long run; and 
• It may involve the calculation of economic prices, e.g., shadow wage rate. 
 
These informational requirements make Cost-Benefit Analysis difficult and costly to 
implement, so that it is usually applied to large infrastructure investments (see Florio, 
2006).  To apply it to other aspects of regional policy, such as grants, a simplification 
is desirable.  One approach is simply to assume that price changes are small, in which 
case there is no displacement or indirect effects, and except for the multiplier effects, 
the outcome is essentially the impact.  Another approach is a stripped-down form of 
Cost-Benefit Analysis, known as the Effects Method (see DAC 1992).  This involves 
identifying the change in income accruing to each agent in an accounting framework.  
Under reasonable assumptions this gives the same result as Cost-Benefit Analysis.  As 
a final point, Cost-Benefit Analysis has an aspect that may make it undesirable. This 
is because it assumes away adjustment costs (i.e., displaced workers costlessly and 
instantaneously transfers to the new activities promoted by the intervention), but this 
ignores search and training, and that the new job opportunities may occur in different 
parts of the country.  Adjustment costs and equity considerations have traditionally 
been important rationales for regional policy interventions. 
 
4: ‘Additionality’ 
 
It remains to consider the link between the outputs and the outcomes in Figure 1. The 
focus is on the survey approach, of which the main concern is ‘additionality’.  This is 
the extent to which an intervention changes a project, either in scale, location or 
timing.  The section begins by tracing the development of ‘additionality’, and the 
different ways it has been used in practice. Subsequently, it is reconciled with theory, 
but focusing on the scale dimension only. 
 
4.1 ‘Additionality’ in Practice 
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The micro-evaluation of regional policy originally reflected dissatisfaction with the 
macro-methods in opening-up the ‘black-box’ of evaluation.  According to Marquand 
(1980), further macroeconomic evaluative work did “not appear a particularly fruitful 
route to follow”, while microeconomic studies were necessary to determine the merits 
of particular instruments (para. 165). The appeal of ‘additionality’ to the Government 
is easily understood, as it helps to ensure ‘value for money’ in its public expenditure.  
However, it is in much the same way that a firm would ensure ‘value for money’ in its 
advertising expenditure, and it is a misconception of social welfare.  This is because it 
implies that any loss to the Government is automatically a loss to society as a whole.13   
 
4.1.1 Evolution of ‘Additionality’ 
 
Employment cost-effectiveness was an important concern in early UK regional policy 
efforts, with the 1960 Local Employment Act requiring the Board of Trade to pay 
attention to “the relationship between the expenditure involved and the employment 
likely to be provided” (see Wren, 1996a).  However, the direct job link was dropped 
in the mid-1960s, and it only reappeared in the 1980s when the cost-effectiveness of 
the policy was called into question, since when ‘additionality’ has been a key concern.  
The first application of ‘additionality’ (known to the author) was an evaluation of the 
Small Firms Employment Subsidy (SFES) (Department of Employment, 1978).  This 
was an experimental special employment measure for manufacturing firms with less 
than 50 employees locate in the regional policy designated Assisted Areas only.14  It 
was time limited, so that important evaluative concern was whether the firms brought 
jobs forward in time to take advantage of the grant. The managers of firms were asked 
to put the jobs into one of three mutually-exclusive categories: 
• The jobs would have been created when they were; 
• The jobs would not have been created but for the subsidy; and 
• The jobs were brought forward in time to take advantage of the subsidy. 
 
The SFES evaluation did not explicitly use the term ‘additionality’, but it revealed it 
to be a multi-dimensional concept.15  The first dimension is whether a project would 
have gone ahead or not in the absence of support (a binary variable), and, conditional 
on this, the second dimension is in what form the project would have gone ahead in 
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terms of its scale, timing or location.  The subsequent evolution of ’additionality’ in 
UK regional policy evaluations is shown in Table 1. Numerous studies on the role of 
incentives in the investment decisions of firms were conducted in the early 1980s (see 
Begg and McDowall, 1987), but Table 1 shows that they failed to recognise the multi-
dimensional nature of ‘additionality’, combining the two dimensions into a single 
scale.  However, this makes the responses difficult to interpret, e.g., the intervention 
was “important to implementation but not crucial”. 
 The early studies probed the role of the incentives in investment appraisal, but 
in fact they revealed little about the effects of the grants.  This was because the firms 
tended to include the automatic grants in investment appraisal, which were certain, 
even though discretionary grants proved to be more effective.16  Investment managers 
were asked about the influence of the incentives on the investment decision, with 
close-ended alternatives.  Table 1 shows that these varied from a simple three-point 
scale in McDowall and Begg (1981) to a four-point scale in Herron (1981) and a five-
point scale in McGreevy and Thomson (1983).  Perhaps the most sophisticated of the 
investment-decision studies was Allen et al (1986), carried out in 1984.  This asked 
respondents to rank the effect of grants on the investment decision, but ranging from 
“0 = no influence to 3 = turning ‘no go’ into ‘go’” (p. 68).  
 Not all studies treated ‘additionality’ as one-dimensional in nature.  The SFES 
evaluation realised a project could be changed in timing, while McDowall and Begg 
(1981) also probed this issue.  They found that about half of the 95 projects surveyed 
would have been significantly modified in timing or scale, but that of the remainder, 
14% said the aid was “necessary” and the other 35% found it “not necessary”. PIEDA 
(1986) separately probed the issue of scale (according to a 4-point scale) and location.  
In the latter case, for firms indicating they had undertaken an appraisal of alternative 
locations, they asked if the grant influenced their decision, and 40 of the 55 managers 
responded positively. However, it was the study of Robinson et al (1987) that brought 
these different aspects together in a single study.  This allowed for the possibility that 
a project may be changed in timing, scale or location, and which formed the basis for 
subsequent Government evaluations (King, 1990; PACEC, 1993; and AEP, 2000).  
An important feature of the Government-funded regional policy evaluations is 
that they sought to systematically quantify ‘additionality’, e.g., measure the period by 
which a project is brought forward or the amount by which it is increased in scale (see 
Table 1).  This allows the different components to be combined into a single measure 
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of job effect, while the evaluations also applied a discount rate for the value of time, 
so that the jobs were expressed in present value years or as discounted job lifetimes 
(Wren, 2005b). These evaluations are interesting, although difficult to interpret and 
use, as comparable measures are not adopted elsewhere. 
 
4.1.2 Qualitative Results for ‘Additionality’ 
 
A comparison of the ‘additionality’ of UK regional grants is made in Table 2 for those 
studies that treat it as multi-dimensional.  The first column gives results for automatic 
grants (available at fixed rates), and the other columns for selective assistance, where 
the grant rate is discretionary.  In the first two columns there may be some difficulty 
with the question on location, which inflates the ‘abandoned altogether’ response (see 
table note), while the attraction of foreign-owned plants was increasingly important in 
the late 1980s and 1990s, increasing the ‘another location’ response. 
Overall, Table 2 shows that, according to respondents, around 80 per cent of 
projects would have gone ahead in some fashion without the public support, but that 
about 20 per cent of projects would have been abandoned altogether.  The latter are 
known as ‘wholly additional projects’. Of the projects going ahead, about 20 per cent 
would have gone ahead in an unchanged form (which is greater for automatic grants), 
and these are referred to as ‘wholly non-additional’ projects.  The grant associated 
with these projects is referred to as ‘deadweight expenditure’, although it is a misuse 
of the term, as it is a transfer.  The welfare loss is associated with the excess burden of 
the taxation used to finance the intervention, and not the grant itself. 
 Inspection of the responses in Table 2 for the projects that went ahead, but in a 
changed form offers reasonably consistent findings across the studies and over time.  
It is reassuring in the sense that if there are biases associated with the survey approach 
then at least they appear to be consistent, which may help validate comparison across 
studies.  However, there are several ways in which the exploration of ‘additionality’ is 
deficient in these studies, as follows: 
• The measures of ‘additionality’ are qualitative rather than quantitative, so that 
it is not known if a project was brought forward in time by five years or just a 
month, say, and likewise for the scale.  
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• ‘Additionality’ explores whether the supported projects are changed in timing, 
scale or location, but there are other ways in which projects may be changed, 
e.g. quality, time duration or activity, which are unexplored.   
• ‘Additionality’ can arise from changes that are induced at different stages of 
the production process, involving either the inputs and / or activities (Booth di 
Giovanni, 2004, and Figure 1), but again this aspect is little explored.17   
 
4.2  ‘Additionality’ and Theory 
 
‘Additionality’ features strongly as a concept in UK micro-evaluation, and to a lesser 
extent in EU Cohesion policy, but it is absent from US evaluations.  No doubt this is 
because ‘additionality’ fails to appear in the literature on Cost-Benefit Analysis or in 
economic appraisal.  As such, we may ask whether ‘additionality’ has any force at all 
in Economics?  ‘Additionality’ is multi-dimensional, and it is useful to focus on these 
two aspects.  The first is ‘wholly non-additional’ expenditure (where the intervention 
has no effect), and the second is where the intervention is ‘additional’. 
 
4.2.1 ‘Wholly non-additional’ expenditure 
 
Wholly non-additional expenditure is when public support leads to an observed output 
that is identical to the output that would have occurred in the counter-factual position 
(in scale, timing and location), so that there is a zero outcome in Figure 1.  This is at 
odds with the marginalist tradition of Economics, where successive increments in an 
intervention (e.g., the grant rate) should lead to successively greater effects.  Figure 1 
suggests wholly non-additional assistance can arise in either of two ways:   
• The level of total inputs / funds committed is unchanged by the intervention. 
• The activities are different but an identical output is produced. 
 
The reason why ‘additionality’ (or anything similar) does not feature in the literature 
on Cost-Benefit Analysis is that it is project appraisal by the public sector and where 
the project is implemented by this sector, so that ‘additionality’ simply does not arise. 
The issue that is addressed in appraisal is whether there are better projects that could 
be implemented, or even none at all.  Nevertheless, it is possible to identify the idea of 
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‘non-additionality’ occurring in other areas of Economics in relation to the inputs 
(finance) and the activities, although not identified as such. 
First, in the literature on inter-governmental grants it is entirely feasible that a 
proportionate matching grant will have no effect (see Cullis and Jones, 1998).  This is 
shown in Figure 3(a) where a grant towards good x leads to a movement from a to b, 
but with no increase in the output of x, as the grant is diverted towards y, reflecting 
the agent’s preferences or indifference curves, IC.   Second, in the literature on public 
goods, Brennan and Pincus (1983) show that the outcome may be unaffected by the 
Government when individuals adjust their private behaviour.  This is shown in Figure 
3(b). Whatever output of x produced by the Government (say at a on the production 
possibility curve, ppc), individuals undertake private provision to locate at b.  The 
output of x is unchanged by the public sector, so there is a zero outcome, even though 
the private activities are changed. 
 The above cases relate to the literature on public sector economics, but other 
explanations for ‘non-additionality’ arise when grant assistance towards investment is 
considered.  These explanations are on the funding side, as follows: 
• Lump sum grants:  It is not tied to any activity of the firm, and since incentives 
are unchanged the firm implements the without-subsidy project. 
• Indivisibilities: Even when the grants are proportionate there may have no 
effect on firm behaviour if the investment is fixed in scale.  An increase in the 
grant rate simply increases the proportion of investment that is funded from 
public sources.  It perhaps explains the poor performance of UK automatic 
regional grants, which funded large fixed-scale investments (Wren, 1996a). 
• Moral hazard:  Industrial support is a principal-agent relationship, so the firm 
can be viewed as undertaking investment on behalf of the Government in 
return for assistance.  If the Government does not monitor the investment the 
firm decreases its private funds ex post to implement the without-subsidy 
scale, as its opportunity cost of funds is unchanged (Wren, 2003).  Indeed, the 
firm can falsely submit a larger project scale ex ante and cut its private funds 
ex post to get the whole project funded by the public sector. 
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These give theoretical support for the observed phenomenon of wholly non-additional 
assistance.  These explanations focus on the funding side, but similar considerations 
apply to the activities, e.g., foreign-owned plants that are not changed in location. 
 
4.2.2 ‘Additional’ expenditure 
 
The second dimension of ‘additionality’ relates to projects that are changed in some 
way by Government support.  This can occur in many ways, but interest here is in 
projects that are changed in scale, focusing on the employment effect.18  First of all, 
we can derive an expression for ‘additionality’ in relation to the investment scale.  For 
this, let F and A denote the respective private and public funds committed to a project, 
where superscripts * and W indicate the with- and without-subsidy positions.  Then, 
we can define an ‘additionality coefficient’ d (≥ -1), as follows: 
 
(1)    1+ d = F * + A( )− FW
A
, 
 
where F* + A is the with-subsidy project scale and FW is the without-subsidy scale.  
When d > 0, private funds increase between the with and without-subsidy positions 
(i.e., F* > FW), but when d < 0 they decrease, such that the assistance is ‘wholly non-
additional’ when d = -1.  In this case, F* + A = FW, so there is no increase in project 
scale, and assistance simply substitutes for the private funds (Wren, 1996b). 
 An expression for d can be derived from an optimising problem.19  Assuming 
a homogeneous production function of degree n (< 1) and exogenous grant rate g, 
then: 
 
 (2)    d = (1− g)
g
1− (1− g)
n
1−n
⎡ 
⎣ ⎢ 
⎤ 
⎦ ⎥ . 
 
Since n > 0 the ‘additionality coefficient’ decreases with the grant rate, but whether d 
is positive or not (i.e., private funds increase or not) depends on the parameter values.  
This can be explored by considering some values for these.  When n = 1 / 2, then d = 
1 - g > 0, so private funds increase above the without-subsidy level. However, when n 
= 2 / 3, then d = (1 - g) (1 - 2g), so that private funds fall below the without-subsidy 
level when the grant rate is sufficiently high, i.e., d < 0 when g > 1 / 2.   
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These suggest that when n and g are sufficiently large, the firm implements a 
larger project scale but that it cuts back its private funds.  In this case, the assistance is 
‘additional’ (a larger scale is implemented), but that the Government wholly funds the 
extra investment and also makes a contribution to firm profits.  It suggests the concept 
of ‘additionality’ is deficient, and that it cannot guarantee ‘value for money’.  This is 
because it focuses on the scale and ignores what is happening to the firm’s private 
funds, but it is this that is relevant to determining ‘deadweight’ spending. 
 As a second point, it is possible to derive a relationship between the labour 
demand (L*) and the funds committed to a project.  For this, consider the relationship 
between the project inputs and the funds as follows: w L* + q I* = F* + A, where I is 
project capital costs at a unit price q and the w is the wage rate.  Then, assuming fixed 
factor proportions, I* = γ L*, the following can be derived straightforwardly, 
 
 (3)    L * = F * + A
w + γ q . 
 
Combining (1) and (3) gives: 
 
 (4)    L * = F
W + (1+ d) A
w + γ q . 
 
The employment effectiveness of assistance is ∆ L*  / ∆ A  = (1 + d) / (w + γ q).  This 
does not just depend on the ‘additionality coefficient’ d, but a range of other factors, 
such as factor prices, production technology parameters and the grant rate.   There are 
several implications.  First, it suggests the regression estimates from (4) of the form, 
L* = α + β ,A are unable to disentangle ‘additionality’ from the other components.20  
Second, the estimates of effectiveness will vary across firms, and will not just depend 
on ‘additionality’, but on the characteristics of the firms themselves, e.g., wage rate, 
price of capital goods and the state of technology. 
 
5: Conclusions 
 
This paper seeks to reconcile evaluative practice with theory, focusing on the micro-
evaluation of regional policy.  It focuses on two important issues: the external effects, 
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which link the outcomes and impacts; and ‘additionality’, which links the outputs and 
outcomes, and which is the central to the industrial survey approach.   
 In relation to the first of these, the paper explores the application of Cost-
Benefit Analysis to the measurement of the direct and external effects (displacement 
and linkage effects), and shows that it can potentially simplify the measurement of the 
impact, which is ultimately of interest.  However, it means that the evaluation is based 
on agent surpluses rather than (gross) effects, which poses a number of problems, and 
ultimately it may embody assumptions that are undesirable to the practitioner.  On the 
second issue of ‘additionality’, the paper argues that it is a two-dimensional concept, 
where the first dimension is whether a project would otherwise have gone ahead or 
not, and the second dimension is in what form. ‘Wholly non-additional’ policy occurs 
in funding or activities, and the paper shows that it has a good foundation in theory, 
even though it is absent from the economic appraisal literature.  Further, as currently 
used in evaluations ‘additionality’ is deficient, as fails to capture the ‘incentive’ effect 
on the private funds of firms.  Ultimately, this is the source of deadweight transfers, 
where the firm reduces its private funds with the incidence of public support. 
 Finally, cost-benefit analysis is often advocated in relation to evaluation (but 
poorly understood, as it is often used to mean the measurement of the benefits and the 
costs), but where it is properly used it is primarily in appraisal.21 In fact, current UK 
micro-evaluative practice, in relation to regional policy and other support measures, 
occupies something of a halfway house between pragmatism and theory. Some agents 
are included in the evaluations but others ignored (i.e., producers but not consumers); 
the opportunity costs are usually ignored in both output and input markets, e.g., cost 
of producing the displaced output or the resource cost of supplying labour; while the 
studies on the job effect tend to measure the jobs lost from the displacement of output, 
but ignore the effects occurring in labour markets.  Hopefully, this paper has served to 
inform on some of the misunderstandings and misconceptions in current practice, and 
to indicate the role that theory can play. 
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Figure 1: The ‘Logic Model’ of Evaluation 
 
 
 Observed  Counter-factual  
     
 INPUT  INPUT  
 Ð  Ð  
 ACTIVITIES  ACTIVITIES  
 Ð  Ð  
 OUTPUT  OUTPUT  
Objective Ô  Ó Approach
     
Specific  OUTCOME  Microeconomic 
  Ð   
Global  IMPACT  Macroeconomic
 
Note: Development of diagram in EC (2000). 
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Figure 2: Displacement in the Output Market 
 
 
 
Source: Compiled by author. 
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 Table 1: The Evolution of ‘Additionality’ 
 
 
Single dimension 
Dichotomous 
Department of Employment (1978): went ahead or not. 
Polychotomous 
McDowall and Begg (1981): 3-point scale (crucial, important or unimportant). 
Herron (1981): 4-point scale (crucial, considerable, some or none). 
McGreevy & Thomson (1983): 5-point scale (from unchanged to cancelled). 
Multi-dimensional 
Qualitative 
Department of Employment (1978): changed in timing. 
McDowall and Begg (1981): changed in timing or scale. 
PIEDA (1986): changed in location and 4-point scale for went ahead or not. 
Robinson et al (1987): changed in timing, scale or location. 
Quantitative 
King (1990), PACEC (1993) and AEP (2000). 
 
Source: Compiled by author. 
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Table 2: Results on Regional Policy ‘Additionality’ 
 
 
Automatic Selective assistance  
Period: 1985 1985 1980-84 1985-88 1991-95
Column: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
      
Abandoned Altogether 20.8* 40.5* 21.5 25.5 13.5 
      
Gone Ahead  73.0 38.4 73.1 68.4 82.5 
Of which:      
Unchanged 39.6 13.4 22.1 15.1 19.3 
Later in time 19.4 13.5 16.8 29.2 24.0 
Smaller scale 13.2 9.6 14.8 13.2 12.9 
Another location 0.8* 1.9* 19.4 10.9 26.3 
(Outside UK) - - (13.4) (9.0) (18.1) 
(Inside UK) - - (6.0) (1.9) (8.2) 
      
Other** 6.2 21.1 5.4 6.1 4.1 
Number of sample firms 129 52 149 212 165 
 
Sources: (1) and (2): Robinson et al, 1987; (3): King, 1990; (4): PACEC, 1993; and (5): AEP, 
2000. 
Notes: Percentage of firms responding to question on what would have occurred in the absence 
of regional grants, given alternatives shown.   
*These firms were given the alternative of ‘another establishment in the same company’, so 
that they may have given ‘abandoned altogether’ as the response for a different location.   
** Columns (1) and (2) includes the not known or not stated cases, whereas for other columns 
it is some combination of effects. 
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Figure 3: ‘Non-Additionality’ in Economics 
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Endnotes 
                                                 
1 This is not to say that all evaluation is atheoretical, as some macro-based approaches 
rely heavily on theory, but not the literature on economic appraisal. 
2 This approach has biases, on which there is little evidence (Smith, 2004), but which 
are not our focus.  Lenihan (1999) tackles the issue of strategic bias, but in addition 
there are sampling, hypothetical, starting-point and information bias (Wren, 2005a). 
3 The outcomes are sometimes referred to as the results, while the UK HM Treasury 
(1997, updated in 2003a) ‘Green Book’ conflates outputs and outcomes, referring to 
these as outputs and to the impacts as outcomes.  Even at the World Bank, QAG notes 
confusion over outputs and outcomes (QAG, 2003, p. 12). 
4 These are pecuniary external effects, which differ from the technological external 
effects, or externalities, which alter the conditions under which goods and services are 
consumed or produced.  Externalities are outside the paper’s scope, but are relevant to 
regional policy interventions (e.g., improvements in infrastructure). 
5 It can be illustrated in the case of regional policy in England. The global objective of 
regional policy is to “make sustainable improvements in the economic performance of 
all English regions and over the long term reduce the persistent gap in growth rates 
between the regions” (HM Treasury, 2003b).  The specific objective of the grants is to 
“encourage sound projects, which would improve employment opportunities in the 
Assisted Areas” (House of Commons, 2005). 
6 The terms ‘displacement’ and ‘linkage’ effects are best reserved for these. 
7 If firms engage in non-price competition (e.g., product quality or branding) then this 
requires a generalisation of the analysis. Where interventions are small there are no 
price effects, and Cost-Benefit Analysis coincides with current evaluative practice. 
Preferences are quasi-linear, so that Hicksian and Marshallian demands coincide. 
8 Holden and Swales (1995) give the only other known analysis of displacement. 
9 In fact, it is smaller than this, as the displaced output is at the old and higher price. 
10 The first reveals by how much the demand price falls in response to the shift in the 
supply curve, and the second by how much existing suppliers will respond to this. 
11 For example, King (1990) makes an adjustment for the job displacement effect of 
regional policy of 27% based on the displacement of output, but ignoring the effect in 
the labour market that occurs through a wage effect. 
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12 Space constraints prevent a formal analysis, but which can be found in Chapter 10 
of Sugden and Williams (1978), or in Chapter 4 of Schofield (1987). 
13 In the language of social choice theory it views the Government as a dictator. Thus, 
a ‘wholly non-additional’ subsidy payment to a firm, which does not change the firm 
behaviour, is viewed as a deadweight welfare loss, but in fact it is a transfer, as while 
the Government is worse-off the firm is better-off, on which more is said below. 
14 It paid a fixed weekly lump sum amount in respect of each employee for a period of 
up to six months, and operated for nine months up to the end of March 1978. The 
evaluation involved just 110 respondent firms. 
15 Allen et al (1986) refer to “additional investment”, hinting at the origin of the term, 
but it was not until the mid-1980s that ‘additionality’ was coined. 
16 Of those firms carrying out formal investment appraisal, Allen et al (1986) find that 
about 80 per cent included automatic incentives, but which was only 40 per cent for 
discretionary grants.  In general, around two-thirds of firms carried out appraisal. 
17 An exception is the evaluation of the Small Firms Loan Guarantee Scheme 
(KPMG, 1999), where three kinds of ‘finance additionality’ are distinguished: those 
firms who had no other source of funds; and those who could have either fully- or 
part-funded it from elsewhere.  For the 13.4% of projects that would have gone ahead 
unchanged in column (2) of Table 2, Robinson et al (1987) find that virtually all of 
these projects would have used external rather than internal finance. 
18 Wren and Jones (2007) consider the issue of grants and industrial location. 
19 This is taken from Wren (1996c), where further explanation can be found. 
20 Contrary to this, Lenihan and Hart (2004) report attempts to regress ‘wholly non-
additional’ projects on various firm characteristics for Irish assistance schemes. 
21 Notable exceptions are the International Finance Corporation (IFC) of the World 
Bank and the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the OECD, which have 
sophisticated procedures for evaluation. 
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